

28 March 1978

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[redacted]
Human Resources Division

HSG #1312

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[redacted] here are some tentative reactions to the questions you posed during your telephone call on 27 March. It is hard to deal with the questions for several reasons. We have not seen and studied ~~to study~~ by [redacted] dealing with ~~*LITINT*~~ LITINT. If we had seen the study, we are not at all sure what we would agree with all the conclusions reached. More importantly, it is not obvious what is meant by "LITINT." It is not a common term used in the Intelligence Community; it has not been included in the Glossary of Intelligence Terms now being prepared.

I gather that LITINT refers to "intelligence information derived from various sorts of ~~scholarly~~ scholarly and popular publications, including those issued by the US (and other?) Governments."

Question 1. If available LITINT was increased 100 percent, what would the analysts have to forego using/doing? Answer. The question seems to assume that analysts are fully employed, working at capacity. I do not believe that this is the case. Certainly ways must be found to make it easier for analysts to screen more efficiently the growing mounts of intelligence information available from all sources. So, regarding "literature," it would be important that gists of articles be available; they would have to be very carefully prepared. The gists could be included in a computer file and be retrievable "on line" in a SAFE-type environment. Analysts should be given the capability to call up gists by title, author, topic, whatever. If the gist suggests that more careful study is required, the full text should be available on microfiche/

Question 2. Should LITINT collection activities be administered centrally (like FBIS administers Foreign Media)? ~~perhaps~~. Answer. Perhaps. FBIS already provides some "LITINT." Other unclassified literature needs to be gisted under guidelines and under the supervision of intelligence professionals. But the work could largely be done "on contract." This is the FBIS/JPRS model. Some kind of clearing house for US Government publications would have to exist, with such publications screened and those of possible interest selected for "gisting." The program could be monitored by HRD.

Question 3. If national intelligence production was ~~devised~~ divided into its component parts, what are the parts that increased LITINT could/might benefit? Where is LITINT not likely to help? Answer. It is hard to say, since no one seems to know what kind of LITINT is out there that has not already been systematically exploited by intelligence analysts. Intelligence, by definition, involves the use of ~~secret~~ "secret" information. Thus analysts fascinated by the availability of such secret information ~~are~~ cleared to use it, and practiced in its use, quite naturally and necessarily concentrate their

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efforts in providing that dimension to analysis that secret information enables. Unclassified resource should largely be left to scholars. Having said that, it is important that intelligence analysts have the benefit of the scholarly research that does exist and of all relevant information publically available. We sometimes have complained that analysts are not aggressive enough in ensuring that they have tapped the pool of the all ready available before asking for new intelligence information collection efforts or embarking on new courses of analytical research.

Certainly, LITINT is not likely to help the current intelligence analyst much. It should be helpful to (and is helpful) to political, economic, military, and scientific researchers. Our impressions are that the scientific researchers take some care already to ensure that they ~~an~~ have examined all available literature on their subjects. Of course, there may be literature available inside or outside the US Government of which they are unaware. Our guess is that the economic researchers also do pretty well; the military researchers a little less well; the political researchers could use some encouragement (many of them are involved in or were trained in current intelligence analysis and are not used to long-range indepth research).

Frankly, I am unwilling to be more specific until I know more precisely what you are dealing with. Certainly, we could survey NFAC analysts at some point if that ~~provide~~ proves to be desirable.

☐ I hope the above is useful. I would appreciate it if you could acquire a copy of the ☐ study for us. And ☐ we will be interested in participating with your "working group" when it is established.

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